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WHO'S AFRAID OF THOMAS CROMWELL?
H. JEFFERSON POWELL*
Robert Bolt's famous play A Man for All Seasons' can easily be
read (or seen) as a starkly dualistic story of the struggle between
Good and Evil. The man of conscience, Sir Thomas More, nobly
vindicates Dr. Johnson's tribute to him as "the person of the greatest
virtue these islands ever produced. '2 More valiantly seeks to reconcile
obedience to God, his love for his family and his profession, and his
loyalty to King Henry VIII but is brought low by the King's insatiable
lusts and his henchmen's determination to destroy More if they
cannot corrupt him. Among the henchmen, Thomas Cromwell stands
out as the figure most nearly opposite to More himself. More is a
reluctant public servant who "was commanded into office; it was
inflicted on" him; Cromwell is the "coming man" whose steady rise to
power and prominence is uninterrupted throughout the play's
duration.3 Where More is deeply pious, Cromwell sees religious faith
as a personal impediment to be discarded. 4 Where More sees the
question whether Henry can divorce his barren wife Catherine as a
matter of conscience, Cromwell believes it to be entirely a question of
"convenience" to be resolved by employing the most expedient
means of eliminating the difficulties that lie in the path of the
* Professor of Law, Duke University. Thanks to Kate Bartlett and Randy Lee for
comments and encouragement.
1. ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS: A PLAY IN Two ACTS (Random House
1990) (1960). Subsequent citations to the play are simply to the page number. In most
quotations from the play I have silently omitted the stage directions.
2. Bolt quotes Samuel Johnson's as well as Robert Whittinton's much earlier description
of More, from which Bolt took the play's title, as epigrams for the play. See id. at v.
3. See id. at 9, 26. Late in the play, Cromwell expresses a dark fear that "if I bring about
More's death-I plant my own I think," id. at 137, a foreboding the accuracy of which the play
has already confirmed, see id. at 127. As an aside, perhaps I should note that in this essay I am
solely interested in Bolt's characters. The fidelity with which his characters portray their
historical antecedents is not at issue here.
4. In the process of taking on as a prot6g6 and tool Richard Rich, the feckless young
scholar who ultimately betrays More through perjury, Cromwell asks:





sovereign's will.' Where More ultimately goes to the executioner's
block by refusing to compromise his loyalty to the law of God and
indeed to the English Constitution, Cromwell betrays the law he
extols by using subornation of perjury to bring More down. More
triumphs over tyranny by what Bolt calls his "adamantine sense of his
own self";6 Cromwell turns himself into an infinitely flexible tool of
tyranny, the archetypal heartless bureaucrat. 7
This interpretation of the contrasting characters of More and
Cromwell is a natural one, and indeed it is an acceptable one on afirst
reading of the play. But it will not stand up, I am going to suggest, to
a second and more careful consideration. Rather than offering us
stock figures of virtue and vice, A Man for All Seasons presents us, in
More and Cromwell, complex portraits of what it might mean for a
three-dimensional human being, neither unearthly saint nor
despicable sinner, to be a lawyer. In the end, I will conclude,
Cromwell's apparent badness as a human being is directly linked to
his failure to be a genuinely good lawyer.8 But to see why that might
be so, we must first entertain the substantial reasons one might give
for admiring Thomas Cromwell.
I. THE ADMIRABLE CROMWELL
Begin with what is surely indisputable: Cromwell is a man of
great talents. In the play's first scene, More himself assures us that
Cromwell is
... a very able man.
RICH And so he is!
MORE Yes, I say he is. He's very able.9
Nothing that happens thereafter gives us any reason to doubt More's
evaluation. Throughout the play, Cromwell is portrayed as efficient
5. See id. at 73-74.
6. Id. at xii.
7. See id. at 159 (More's invocation of "the Law of God" and "Magna Carta"); see also id.
at 157 (More's denunciation of Cromwell for setting England on "a long road" on which
"presently [people] will have no hearts").
8. In discussing Bolt's Cromwell, I am going to set to one side the last incident in Act I of
the play, in which Cromwell forces Rich's hand into a candle flame and is accused by Rich of
sadistic pleasure. See id. at 77. The incident is absent from the movie version of A Man for All
Seasons, which I take to be an indication that Bolt, who wrote the screenplay, had become
dissatisfied with it. Be that as it may, the movie proves that scene is unnecessary to Cromwell as
Bolt (ultimately) portrayed him.
9. Id. at 5.
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and effective save only in his efforts to bend More to the King's will.1°
Furthermore, Cromwell is not merely a competent civil servant
narrowly trained along technical lines. Like More, Cromwell is
steeped in the new learning of the Renaissance if, to be sure, with
somewhat different interests and emphases from More.' Cromwell is
ambitious, of course-the King refers to him and those like him as
"jackals with sharp teeth and I am their lion" 2-but we are given no
reason to think that his successes in climbing the ladder of power are
due to anything other than the recognition, by the King and others, of
his abilities.
But, the objection will run, few of us admire ability and learning
that are solely in the service of personal ambition. The fact that
Cromwell has great talents makes his prostitution of them to the
service of his own aggrandizement and Henry's tyrannous designs so
much the worse. And, the objector will conclude, isn't that exactly
what Bolt shows Cromwell doing? The answer to this question,
however, is no. Far from being an unprincipled self-advancer, for
most of the play Bolt's Cromwell is an almost perfect incarnation of
the professional ideal embodied in modern American codes of legal
ethics. The official commentary to the Rules of Professional Conduct
of the bar of which I am a member states that "[a] lawyer should act
with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."' 3 In the case of Bolt's
Cromwell, who is a public official, that ethical ideal would require
him to "act with commitment and dedication to the interests" of King
Henry and of England, and to exercise "zeal in advocacy upon the
10. Pinpoint citation cannot capture the overall impact of Bolt's portraiture, but one might
particularly refer to the dialogue between More and the Duke of Norfolk after More warns
Norfolk that the Spanish ambassador may have been stirring up sedition along the Scottish
border.
NORFOLK ... As for the Spaniard, Thomas, it'll perhaps relieve your mind to know
that one of Secretary Cromwell's agents made the tour with him.
MORE Oh. (A flash of jealousy) Of course if Master Cromwell has matters in hand-
NORFOLK He has.
MORE Yes, I can imagine.
Id. at 93.
11. See, e.g., id. at 5, 13 (references to Cromwell's knowledge of Machiavelli), 38
(Cromwell remarks "I do prepare myself for higher things. I stock my mind."), 98 (Cromwell's
implicit description of himself as "a man of letters" aware of More's European reputation and
the impact abroad of More's apparent disapproval of the King's divorce).
12. Id. at 55. Henry's words amount to an ambiguous compliment at best, but are after all
the self-serving comments of a monumental egotist.
13. NORTH CAROLINA STATE BAR REVISED RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
[hereinafter N.C. RULES] Rule 1.3 cmt. 1.
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[King's and kingdom's] behalf." At least up to the trial of More, that
is what Cromwell says he is doing, and indeed what we see him doing.
Cromwell's earliest self-description comes in a discussion he has
with Chapuys, the Spanish ambassador. Asked in essence for his job
description, Cromwell replies that "I suppose you would call me 'The
King's Ear' . . . It's a useful organ, the ear. But in fact it's even simpler
than that. When the King wants something done, I do it."'t4
Cromwell's later discussion of the role of the public servant is less
colorful but makes it clear that his actions on behalf of the King's
search for a divorce stem from the "commitment and dedication" to
the sovereign's interests that modern legal ethics demands of
government lawyers and which he claims More himself would
endorse. Public office, Cromwell says, involves devotion to "matter[s]
of convenience, administrative convenience."15
CROMWELL ... The normal aim of administration is to keep
steady this factor of convenience-and Sir Thomas would
agree. Now normally when a man wants to change his woman,
you let him if it's convenient and prevent him if it's not-
normally indeed it's of so little importance that you leave it to
the priests. But the constant factor is this element of
convenience.
RICH Whose convenience?
CROMWELL Oh, ours. But everybody's too. However, in the
present instance the man who wants to change his woman is
our Sovereign Lord, Harry, by the Grace of God, the Eighth of
that name.... And our job as administrators is to make it as
convenient as we can.16
Cromwell's brutal language jars, but he is simply echoing the earlier
warning of Cardinal Wolsey that the highest national interests require
that the King secure a divorce.17 Cromwell, in short, is acting on
behalf of society's good ("Whose convenience? ... everybody's") as
determined by society's organ for the expression of the public will
("our Sovereign Lord, Harry").
There is nothing uniquely lawyer-like about a civil servant
expressing a commitment to pursue the goals of the administration
14. BOLT, supra note 1, at 38.
15. Id. at 73.
16. Id. at 73-74.
17. WOLSEY Let [the King] die without an heir and we'll have [civil war] back again.
Let him die without an heir and this "peace" you think so much of will go out like
that! (He extinguishes the candle) Very well then ... England needs an heir ....
Id. at 22.
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that appointed him or her, but Bolt shows us repeatedly that
Cromwell approaches public service from a distinctively legal
perspective. Cromwell carries out the investigation of More's conduct
as a judge and councilor with careful attention to the plausibility of
evidence relating to possible misconduct and repeatedly insists that
the investigation follow "the strict processes of the law." 18 Whatever
the personal tone of irony one may perceive in his invocations of law,
Cromwell's words are those of a lawyer respectful of due process.
RICH I'm only anxious to do what is correct, Secretary.
CROMWELL (Smiling at him) Yes, Richard, I know. (Straight-
faced) You're absolutely right, it must be done by law. It's just
a matter of finding the right law. Or making one. 9
True, his pursuit of the sovereign's interests ultimately requires
Cromwell to make new law wholesale by turning the English legal
and religious world upside down but that observation is no slur on his
professional conduct: modern codes of professional responsibility
identify law reform as a laudable activity and, indeed, as one of the
justifications for lawyers holding public office.20
In the end, of course, Cromwell resorts to perjurious testimony in
order to secure More's conviction, an action permissible under no
one's view of legal or political ethics, but even here Bolt provides the
materials for a plea in mitigation if not exculpation. Cromwell turns
to perjury only when faced with "alternatives [that] are bad" for the
King, the country, and himself.21 Even then Cromwell attempts once
more to secure More's voluntary submission before the trial, at the
trial Cromwell initially tries to establish More's guilt by relying solely
on More's behavior, and at its end Cromwell tries to avoid the guilty
18. Id. at 103. See Cromwell's admission to Norfolk that a charge of bribery cannot be
sustained:
NORFOLK ... In other words, the moment he knew it was a bribe, he got rid of it.
CROMWELL (Nodding judicially) The facts will bear that interpretation, I suppose.
NORFOLK Oh, this is a horse that won't run, Master Secretary.
CROMWELL Just a trial canter, Your Grace.
Id. at 102.
Cromwell himself praises More for his legal ability and integrity before and even during
the investigation. See id. at 74-75 (discussing More's innocence), 98-99 (agreeing with Norfolk
that More does not support Spanish-incited sedition), 100 (describing the decision More gave in
a case in which he was allegedly bribed as "an impeccably correct judgment").
19. Id. at 104.
20. See, e.g., N.C. Rules, supra note 13, Rule 6.5 cmt. 1 ("Lawyers often serve as legislators
or as holders of other public offices. This is highly desirable, as lawyers are uniquely qualified to
make significant contributions to the improvement of the legal system.").
21. See BOLT, supra note 1, at 137.
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verdict he has now ensured by persuading More to acquiesce. 22
Despite his fundamental lack of sympathy with More,23 Bolt's
Cromwell seems driven more out of exasperation than out of malice.
Under modern ethical rules, Cromwell's actions would be deemed
professional misconduct warranting disbarment, 24 but he would hardly
be the first basically decent person who stumbled into a serious moral
error through anger, frustration, and anxiety.
II. WHAT'S REALLY WRONG WITH CROMWELL
There is a substantial case, then, for the proposition that rather
than being the embodiment of bureaucratic evil, Cromwell is a
talented lawyer and public servant who stumbles-disastrously from a
moral point of view but in circumstances of extreme stress25- at the
very end of the play. But the case, though substantial, is not the whole
story and, in the end, it is not the deepest truth about Cromwell. His
flaws run deeper, but they are located in a surprising place.
Cromwell's willingness to do great evil flows out of what seems at first
an almost banal fault, if fault it truly is: he has, in fact, a superficial
understanding of the law. He is not, in a deep sense, a good lawyer.
Begin with a conversation among More, his wife Alice, his
daughter Margaret, and his son-in-law William Roper immediately
before More leaves home to be questioned by Cromwell for the first
time. More jokes that he should "bring Cromwell to dinner .... It'd
serve him right. ''2 6
MARGARET Oh, Father, don't be witty!
MORE Why not? Wit's what's in question.
ROPER While we are witty, the Devil may enter us unawares.
MORE He's not the Devil, son Roper, he's a lawyer! And my case
is watertight!
ALICE They say he's a very penetrating lawyer.
22. See id. at 137, 151-52, 158.
23. See Cromwell's words at the bottom of page 153 and the stage direction there stating
that Cromwell and More "hate each other and each other's standpoint."
24. See NC Rules, supra note 13, Rule 8.4(c)-(d) (defining misconduct to include "conduct
involving dishonesty ... deceit, or misrepresentation" and "conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of justice").
25. Contemporary American prosecutors do not customarily face the possibility of losing
their heads if they fail to win a case for the government.
26. BOLT, supra note 1, at 112. Because of More's resignation from office and disgrace and
his subsequent loss of income, he and his family are living in straitened circumstances, hence the
suggestion that dinner at the Mores' would "serve him right."
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MORE What, Cromwell? Pooh, he's a pragmatist-and that's the
only resemblance he has to the Devil, son Roper; a pragmatist,
the merest plumber.27
A lot is going on in this dialogue and it will repay a careful reading.
More begins with one of his own most pronounced personal
characteristics, a joke. 28 Provoked, unusually, by his levity at a serious
moment, Margaret asks him to refrain from being "witty," but More
turns her reproachful words upside down: precisely because
Cromwell's investigation is no laughing matter, "[w]it's what's in
question." The issue here is not merely about the appropriate place
for humor, although that is part of it. For Bolt's More, wit is a
capacious concept, indeed, it is the defining characteristic of the
human. Later in the play, when he meets Margaret and Roper on his
way home from Cromwell's interrogation, More explains that
God made the angels to show him splendor-as he made animals
for innocence and plants for their simplicity. But Man he made to
serve him wittily, in the tangle of his mind!29
Wit in this enlarged sense is the human capacity for understanding
oneself and others rightly. Living humanly, More implies, demands
the very honesty and lively sense of proportion that characterize a
healthy sense of humor. A person lacking these traits of character is
likely systematically to misunderstand and misvalue self, other
persons, and the social, political, and moral relationships that connect
US.
The Spanish ambassador Chapuys is a perfect, if relatively
benign, example. Entirely without humor himself, Chapuys is quite
incapable of seeing himself or others realistically30 or of understand-
ing the absurdity of his own behavior.31 More's own son-in-law,
27. Id. at 112-13.
28. The historical More was, of course, a notoriously droll man. Bolt clearly intends us to
understand the More of A Man for all Seasons along the same lines. Among many examples in
the play, see More's response to the worldly Cardinal Wolsey's jibe that:
... You should have been a cleric!
MORE (Amused.. .) Like yourself, Your Grace?
Id. at 23-24.
29. Id. at 126.
30. CHAPUYS [explaining the occasion of a visit to More] ... After all, we are
brothers in Christ, you and I!
MORE A characteristic we share with the rest of humanity. You live in Cheapside,
Sigfior? To make contact with a brother in Christ you have only to open your
window and empty a chamberpot. There was no need to come to Chelsea.
Id. at 85.
31. NORFOLK [referring to Chapuys] Funny company, Thomas?
MORE It's quite unintentional. He doesn't mean to be funny.
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Roper, is another example, as he demonstrates in the dialogue we are
considering. Baffled and irritated, as usual, by More's behavior,
Roper responds on the basis of his own predictable disposition for
dividing the world into Light and Dark. More's wittiness, Roper
solemnly warns, represents a drastic and potentially deadly
underestimation of the diabolical forces concentrated in Cromwell:
"While we are witty, the Devil may enter us unawares. 3 2 More simply
laughs at this example of Roper's reflexive Manichaeanism. Arguing
with Cromwell is no supernatural battle with a figure of Satanic
dimensions, but only an ordinary debate with a fellow lawyer, one in
which it is More's cause that is the "watertight" case.33
At this point Alice More interjects a cautionary note of a quite
different sort. Accepting her husband's assertion that confrontation
with Cromwell will call upon More's wit as a lawyer, she reminds
More that by common repute, Cromwell himself is an outstanding
practitioner of More's own profession, "a very penetrating lawyer."' 4
More is unwise indeed, Alice suggests, if in his pride he assumes his
own professional superiority to Cromwell. But despite his repeated
acknowledgments of Cromwell's abilities, More dismisses with
contempt his rival's professional character and thus, his wife's
concerns: "What, Cromwell? Pooh, he's a pragmatist ... a pragmatist,
the merest plumber."35 What can More mean by this surprising
comment?
Perhaps the most obvious answer, one that Bolt has skillfully set
up for us at several earlier points in the play, is that More is
dismissive of Cromwell's pragmatism because More himself is deeply
nonpragmatic, systematically and even stubbornly other-worldly. At
an early point in the play, this possibility is raised both by More's
steward and Cardinal Wolsey. The steward remarks that More
"would give anything to anyone"3 6 and worries that this trait or
compulsion will ultimately endanger More: "[S]ome day someone's
going to ask him for something that he wants to keep; and he'll be out
Id. at 89.
32. Id. at 112.
33. See id.
34. Id. at 113.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 17. The dialogue continues:
STEWARD Some say that's good and some say that's bad, but I say he can't help it ....
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of practice."37 In the following scene, Wolsey repeatedly upbraids
More for his lack of political realism.
WOLSEY ... You're a constant regret to me, Thomas. If you could
just see facts flat on, without that horrible moral squint; withjust a little common sense, you could have been a statesman.38
As the interview closes, Wolsey warns More that, as the steward has
already intimated, More's lack of pragmatism puts him in danger.
WOLSEY ... come down to earth, Thomas. And until you do, bear
in mind you have an enemy!
MORE Where, your Grace?
WOLSEY (Looks back at him, hard-faced, harsh; for the first time
we see this is a carnivore) Here, Thomas.39
This interpretation of More's character as essentially and deliberately
impractical is suggested at later points as well, perhaps most directly
by the Common Man's discussion of More's reputation for sanctity.
COMMON MAN ... saintliness is a quality less easy to establish
[than scholarship]. But from his willful indifference to realities
which were obvious to quite ordinary contemporaries, it seems
all too probable that he had it.4°
On this reading, More's dismissal of Cromwell's professionalism as
the pragmatism of "the merest plumber" would simply be a
restatement of More's own fundamental lack of concern for
"realities." And if that is correct, it is very difficult not to share
Alice's concern that her husband is underestimating the threat
Cromwell poses: few of us, I think, would want to be represented by a
lawyer willfully indifferent to obvious realities.
This understanding of More, though obvious, cannot be right. In
the first place, it is not the ultimate judgment of the play's hard-bitten
realists, Cardinal Wolsey and Cromwell. Despite Wolsey's anger with
More and his description of himself as More's enemy, we learn from
none other than Henry VIII that "Wolsey named [More] for
Chancellor ... and Wolsey was no fool. '41 Despite Cromwell's belief
that More's "innocence" has entangled More in difficulties that a
37. Id.
38. Id. at 19.
39. Id. at 23.
40. Id. at 36. The Common Man, who doubles as More's steward, periodically discusses the
play with the audience. In the preface, Bolt describes the Common Man "as a portrayal of that
mythical beast, The Man in the Street." Id. at xix.
41. Id. at 52. This fact is startling: the exchange in which Wolsey labeled himself More's




more worldly person would have avoided, Cromwell clearly
recognizes in More a worthy and skilled opponent; as he tells Rich at
the end of Act I, in contrast to those who are "only fit for Heaven
.... Sir Thomas has plenty of sense. '42 Secondly, More's own
comments make it clear that he emphatically values and admires the
practical skills of a good lawyer or statesman. More praises Wolsey to
the King as "a statesman of incomparable ability," while he assures
his family that it is his legal skill that ensures his and their safety: "[I]n
the thickets of the law, oh, there I'm a forester. I doubt if there's a
man alive who could follow me there, thank God. '43 Finally, More's
skillful conduct of his own defense in the two interrogation scenes
and at his trial demonstrates that his self-appraisal is not an egotistical
mistake. To Cromwell's repeated frustration, More cannot be snared
through the legal process until that process itself is corrupted. More is
an intensely practical and proficient lawyer and his disparagement of
Cromwell as "a pragmatist, the merest plumber" cannot rest on
hostility to effectiveness in lawyering.
What is wrong with Cromwell as a lawyer according to More is
that Cromwell fundamentally misunderstands the law itself. This
emerges clearly during the trial. The context is Cromwell's initial
attempt to establish More's treasonable denial of the King's new title
of Supreme Head of the Church in England without resort to
perjurious testimony. Conceding arguendo that More has not actually
made a statement denying the title, Cromwell argues (quite plausibly)
that his silence on the matter is actually "most eloquent denial." a
More's response is highly technical and Cromwell in turn accuses him
of standing on a legalistic quibble.
MORE ... The maxim of the law is "Silence gives consent." If,
therefore, you wish to construe what my silence "betokened,"
you must construe that I consented, not that I denied.
CROMWELL Is that what the world in fact construes from it? Do
you pretend that is what you wish the world to construe from
it?
42. Id. at 77. In the first interrogation scene in Act II, Cromwell acknowledges that More
was "once so effective in the world." Id. at 114. In the same scene Cromwell eventually
acknowledges that More has defeated his efforts to entrap him. See id. at 118. Cromwell's
growing dislike of More in Act I-see id. at 119 ("I don't like him so well as I did") and the
stage direction on page 153 (Cromwell and More "hate each other and each other's
standpoint")-stems from Cromwell's increasing recognition that More's skill at avoiding
submission threatens Cromwell himself. See id. at 137 (Cromwell's speech).
43. Id. at 52, 66.
44. Id. at 152.
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MORE The world must construe according to its wits. This Court
must construe according to the law.
CROMWELL I put it to the Court that the prisoner is perverting the
law-making smoky what should be a clear light to discover to
the Court his own wrongdoing!
MORE The law is not a "light" for you or any man to see by; the
law is not an instrument of any kind. (To the FOREMAN [of the
jury]) The law is a causeway upon which, so long as he keeps
to it, a citizen may walk safely.45
For Cromwell, the law is simply a tool, the means by which one can
achieve certain goals. The goals may be purely selfish-that is in part
what he is accusing More of doing-or they may be in service of the
needs of society and the state. Cromwell's own efforts to bring More
to heel by "finding the right law [o]r making one, '46 after all, serve the
expressed interests of sovereign and people. ("Whose convenience?"
"Oh, ours. But everybody's too. ' 47) Because the law is an instrument,
there is nothing a lawyer can be but a pragmatist. Early in the play,
indeed, Cromwell echoes More's charge that he is the "merest
plumber," but with pride.
CROMWELL ... When the King wants something done, I do it.
CHAPUYS Ah. But then why these Justices, Chancellors,
Admirals?
CROMWELL Oh, they are the constitution. Our ancient, English
constitution. I merely do things. 48
The outward edifice of English justice49 purports to represent a
political order that is more than a smoothly operating bureaucratic
machine for achieving "administrative convenience." But Cromwell
thinks this an empty, or at best ceremonial pretension, on a par with
the ditty he chants at the beginning of the trial scene. 0 A good lawyer,
for Cromwell, is a lawyer adept at utilizing the law to accomplish ends
45. Id. at 152-53.
46. Id. at 104.
47. Id. at 73.
48. Id. at 38.
49. The reader will recall that in this context "admiral" clearly means judge in admiralty.
50. CROMWELL What Englishman can behold without Awe
The Canvas and the Rigging of the Law!
Forbidden here the galley-master's whip-
Hearts of Oak, in the Law's Great Ship!
BOLT, supra note 1, at 148.
Coming from someone who refrained from racking More only because "the King will not
permit it" and is prepared to corrupt the legal process if necessary to achieve his ends, this can




that are necessarily derived from somewhere else. The law itself is an
empty shell, mere process, social plumbing.
More does not, of course, deny the obvious fact that people
invoke the law for reasons-he immediately follows his assertion that
the law is not an instrument by noting the law's utility as a means of
individual self-protection through law-abiding behavior. But unlike
Cromwell, More believes that the law is not, and should not become,
a mere instrument of any kind-or anyone. Even when someone
invokes the law for self-preservation, he or she does so not as an
isolated individual, but as a "citizen," a member of a society that
constitutes itself, in part, in and through the law. Human community
is no automatic product of nature; indeed human error can fracture or
destroy it.51 Instead, human beings make community by their active
participation in creating and maintaining common patterns of life and
thought.52 This is so not because human beings create themselves but
precisely because the nurturance of earthly community, with all its
limits, is part of the human, creaturely task. The political community
necessarily is made up of finite, ignorant, and sinful creatures, and for
its preservation it requires a medium through which the common
good can be debated, social controversies articulated, and political
disputes resolved, in human terms. Law provides such a language, and
its efficacy depends on the ability of all of society's members to see
the law as a shared enterprise that belongs to all rather than as a
mechanism for the exercise of someone's (anyone's, even everyone's
collective) will.
More therefore rejects the reduction of law to a mere instrument
of extra-legal goals, whatever those goals may be. The efforts of
Wolsey, Cromwell, and the King to bend, break, or transform the law
in their pursuit of an heir to the throne are profoundly wrong, but so
is his son-in-law's desire to make the law a tool of divine justice.
MARGARET Father, that man's bad.
MORE There is no law against that.
ROPER There is! God's law!
MORE Then God can arrest him.
ROPER Sophistication upon sophistication!
51. See id. at 22 (More speaks of statesmen "lead[ing] their country by a short route to
chaos").
52. Bolt observes in the preface that "[i]f 'society' is the name we give to human behavior
when it is patterned and orderly, then the Law... is the very pattern of society." Id. at xvi.
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MORE No, sheer simplicity. The law, Roper, the law. I know
what's legal not what's right. And I'll stick to what's legal.
ROPER Then you set man's law above God's!
MORE No, far below; but let me draw your attention to a fact-I'm
not God.53
Because we are, none of us, God, a healthy political community is
"planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws, not
God's. '5 4 The lawyer who recognizes the truth of this will also
recognize a duty to cultivate (which can involve weeding) the law. In
doing so, the lawyer's professional activities become a means of
fulfilling the common human vocation to serve God "wittily, in the
tangle of [our] mind."55 Destroy the law instead by rendering it
entirely instrumental, and the political community will rapidly
become a hell on earth.
Cromwell is a bad lawyer because he thinks the law is nothing
but an instrument or a weapon. He has no feel for the law as a social
bond that unites us even when we invoke it to resolve our disputes.
Although perfectly capable of distinguishing correct legal judgments
from incorrect ones, Cromwell has no idea why that distinction might
matter, no concept of the harm done to society and to all its members
when the law is degraded or warped or corrupted. Aware of the
menace posed by the King's unchecked power,5 6 Cromwell does not
recognize that he himself has unleashed it by breaking down the
human law that limited and channeled it. No figure of diabolical
stature in himself, Cromwell achieves a certain Satanic quality by his
unthinking reduction of the community's law into a tool. "Pooh, he's
a pragmatist-and that's the only resemblance he has to the Devil,
son Roper. ... -57 Unfortunately for More, that resemblance proves
close enough.
III. LAWYERS WITHOUT DOCTRINE
Early in A Man for All Seasons, Richard Rich objects when the
Duke of Norfolk denounces Machiavelli's The Prince as a "[n]asty
53. Id. at 65-66.
54. Id. at 66.
55. Id. at 126.
56. As Cromwell somewhat ruefully notes, "there's no going back, Rich. I find we've made
ourselves the keepers of [the King's] conscience. And it's ravenous." Id. at 120.




RICH The doctrines of Machiavelli have been largely mistaken, I
think; indeed, properly apprehended, he has no doctrine.
Master Cromwell has the sense of it I think when he says- 5 9
Norfolk interrupts at that point, so we never learn precisely what
Cromwell says, but presumably it is along the lines of Rich's assertion
that Machiavelli has no doctrine. Whatever one might say about
Machiavelli, however, in the play it is Cromwell who has "no
doctrine" and necessarily so. If the law is, as he believes, simply a
tool, then its rules, principles, tenets, and holdings can only be
rhetorical tricks of the trade, the surface ornamentation custom
requires when political or personal arguments are presented in
certain forums. Such trivialities obviously can be communicated, but
they are not the proper subjects of "doctrine": doctrina, the patient
construction and explication of teaching within a tradition of thought
and action. Cromwell is a lawyer without doctrine, without a
tradition, without law.
For the whole of the twentieth century, lawyers in the United
States have toyed with the idea that we can and should all be like
Cromwell. Sometimes the thought has seemed liberating, at others
terrifying; for some lawyers it has been both simultaneously. But ever
since Holmes's famous 1897 dictum that "the black-letter man may be
the man of the present, but the man of the future is the man of
statistics and the master of economics," 6 American lawyers have had
to entertain the possibility that we have no doctrine. And if we have
nothing of substance to teach, then legal argument can hardly be
more than a grab-bag of conventional linguistic tricks. Taking legal
argument seriously, other than for purely instrumental purposes, is a
superstition, a bizarre fetishism-an intellectual sin that Roper
directly attributes to More: "I have long suspected this; this is the
golden calf; the law's your god. '6 1
The instrumentalist lawyers in A Man for All Seasons recognize
and are willing to act on the insight that the law is a mere tool.
Nothing in the law should stand in the way of achieving what is good
and right, Roper announces: he would "cut down every law in
58. Id. at 12.
59. Id. at 13.
60. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
61. BOLT, supra note 1, at 66.
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England to do that!"62 Cromwell, of course, is the master of goal-
directed lawyering in the interests of the client.
CROMWELL ... [I]t must be done by law. It's just a matter of
finding the right law. Or making one.63
Legal argument is a tool, and the Cromwellian lawyer knows that
nothing is lost if the tool bends or breaks in the pursuit of the client's
interests. The same analysis applies, of course, when a Cromwell
becomes a judge: the only difference is that the "client" is now
substantive justice, or economic efficiency, or whatever other social
goal or goals the judge deems worthy. To let the forms of legal
argument stand in the way of such goals, at least where it really
matters,64 would be foolish, indeed, a dereliction of duty.
And then there is More, who does take the law and legal
argument seriously. He denies Roper's claim that doing so makes the
law an idol-"Oh, Roper, you're a fool, God's my god" 65-and, as we
have seen, he insists that the law is a human creation, not the gift of
some omnipresence in the sky.66 We must take law seriously because
as a political community we need it. None of us are God, as More
reminds Roper, and even at our best, our grasp of right and wrong,
common good and individual right, will be tinctured by our own
moral and intellectual shortcomings. The law requires us to present
our views and seek our goals through a shared language. Like any
language, law limits and channels what can be said; in doing so, law
sets limits to social conflict and to the threat that political power
always poses to the community. If we destroy the law's integrity in the
pursuit of some goal, however worthy, we break down one of the
necessary conditions of a decent society. Roper's willingness to "cut
down every law in England" to uproot evil is suicidal.
MORE ... [I]f you cut them down-and you're just the man to do
it-d'you really think you could stand upright in the winds that
62. Id.
63. Id. at 104.
64. Judge Cromwell might well accept results based on legal argument where he doesn't
really care about the outcome.
CROMWELL ... Now normally when a man wants to change his woman, you let him if
it's convenient and prevent him if it's not-normally indeed it's of so little
importance that you leave it to the priests.
Id. at 73.
65. Id. at 67.
66. "This country's planted thick with laws from coast to coast-man's laws, not God's."
Id. at 66; cf. Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("The
common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice of some
sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified.").
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would blow then? Yes, I'd give the Devil benefit of law, for my
own safety's sake.67
What Roper wishes for, Cromwell achieves: the wholesale reduction
of law to the tool of power, a tool wielded in what Cromwell believes
the public interest, but a tool nonetheless. The consequences, More
warns, will be catastrophic. Discard the respect for law that enables it
to channel power and conflict, and eventually neither power nor
conflict will have limits.
MORE ... What you have hunted me for is not my actions, but the
thoughts of my heart. It is a long road you have opened. For
first men will disclaim their hearts and presently they will have
no hearts. God help the people whose Statesmen walk your
road.68
American lawyers and judges at the close of the second
millennium are, I think, not yet heartless as a group. Indeed, often we
are filled with passionate intensity, and in itself that is often good.
But, like More, I do not think our passions will remain benign if we
walk the long road that Cromwell opens. Taking legal argument
seriously is a matter of keeping faith with one another. Law as
doctrine and tradition, law that matters to those who practice it and
those who administer it, makes political community possible among
people with divergent interests and perspectives who wish to be
citizens-not subjects. Taking law seriously is one of the ways in
which we enact the democratic axiom that "[t]here is enough
community for us to talk, not enough for anyone to command."69
Lawyers cynical about their profession and judges willing to reach the
"right" result at whatever cost to legal principle aren't clear-eyed
realists but short-sighted adversaries of the common good.
The ways in which lawyers and judges should take law seriously
are debatable. But God help us if we become Cromwell.
67. BOLT, supra note 1, at 66.
68. Id. at 157.
69. Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., to Alice Stopford Green (Aug. 20, 1909), in
THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS FROM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS,
AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., 115, 116 (Richard A. Posner ed.,
1992).
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